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The Polygraph in California: A
Heartbeat Away From Admissibility
Listen, I don't know anything about polygraphs and I don't know how
accurate they are, but I know they'll scare the hell out ofpeople. 1
Polygraphic evidence2 has always been a sensitive topic in the halls
of justice. The question of the admissibility of this evidence, seen by
many to be worthwhile and reliable scientific evidence,3 and by others
as some sort of "wizard of truth",4 has engendered a lengthy debate.'
Polygraphic evidence, excluded from judicial consideration since
1923,6 has nevertheless been a source of continuing fascination for the
American public and the legal profession.' This interest has resulted in
persistent efforts to convince the courts to change their opinions and
permit the introduction of polygraphic evidence.'
The theory of polygraphy is simply stated. A person, when lying,
will display subtle, yet measurable, physiological reactions which can
be charted. To the trained eye, these reactions will reveal whether or
not the subject under polygraphic interrogation is telling the truth.9 No
one questions the validity of the polygraph as a measuring tool of phys-
iological changes in the body.' 0 Many persons, however, hold strong
and contradictory beliefs as to the reliability and validity of the poly-
graphic process, and its probative value as evidence in criminal
matters. ' '
The nation's courts have, generally, heeded the opponents of poly-
1. President Richard M. Nixon, Oval Office Tape, July 14, 1971, quoted in D. LYKKEN, A
TREMOR IN THE BLOOD, 163 (1981) [hereinafter cited as LYKKEN].
2. See LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 37. The most basic definition of polygraphic evidence is
that polygraphy is a means of instrumental interrogation intended to detect lying, used to deter-
mine whether the subject's answers to certain relevant questions are deceptive or truthful. Id
3. See D. RASKIN, G. BARLAND, & J. PODLESNY, VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF DETEC-
TION OF DECEPTION 23-25 (1978) [hereinafter cited as RAsKIN].
4. Meyer, Do Lie Detectors Lie?, SCIENCE 82, June 1982, 24.
5. See generally LYKKEN, supra note I, at 23-47.
6. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
7. See LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 29. A fascinating application of polygraphic techniques
can be found on syndicated television. Attorney F. Lee Bailey, a long-standing advocate of poly-
graphy, has created a new television show pitting celebrities and unknowns against a polygraph
machine for a $25,000 prize for the person who manages to "beat the machine." Sacramento Bee,
Jan. 15, 1983, at 2, col. 1.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 60-112.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 23-47.
10. See United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1381 (S.D. Calif. 1972).
I1. See id at 1381; see also text accompanying notes 48-112.
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graphic evidence and have kept the results of polygraph examinations
out of the courtroom.'2 Following the exclusionary rule established in
Frye v. United States, 3 the seminal case in this area, judges have re-
quired polygraph proponents to show that the theory of polygraphy has
received "general acceptance" by the scientific community.' 4 This re-
quirement most have found impossible to meet,' 5 due in great measure
to judicial hostility toward polygraphy.' 6 Yet a possible revolution in
judicial thinking may be in the offing in California. 7 This change is
heralded by the recent California Court of Appeals decision of Wither-
spoon v. Superior Court,18 which indicated that California courts
should reexamine their attitudes and, at the very least, give the propo-
nents of polygraphic evidence their "day in court."' 9
Assuming that a change should occur, the courts will need to ex-
amine the standards by which the testimony of polygraph operators
will be admitted. Currently, there are no established principles to
guide judges in their examination of the qualifications of polygraph
examiners who will be called on to testify as to the validity of the the-
ory of polygraphy and the results of a polygraph test.2°
This comment will provide an overview of the theory and mechanics
of the polygraph process. The reliability of polygraphic evidence, a
critical factor in the admissibility of this evidence, will be discussed.
The historic treatment of polygraphy will be traced, and the possible
impact of Witherspoon upon judicial decision-making will be noted.
Witherspoon, if it is followed, requires the courts to place the past to
one side and examine, on a case-by-case basis, the admission of poly-
graphic evidence when the proponent has satisfactorily established its
probativeness and reliability. This comment will also suggest a frame-
work to aid the courts in determining whether a polygraph operator,
the conduit through which the results of a polygraph test would pass
into evidence, is sufficiently qualified to testify as an expert witness.
Such a framework would require a judicial evaluation of the exam-
iner's education, experience, ability, and competency.
12. See text accompanying notes 113-149.
13. See 293 F. 1013 at 1014.
14. See id
15. See Comment, Compulsory Process and Polygraphic Evidence: Does Exclusion Violate a
Criminal Defendant's Due Process Rights?, 12 CONN. L. REv. 324, 338, 341, 343 (1980).
16. See Witherspoon v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d, 24, 29, 183 Cal. Rptr. 615, 618
(1982).
17. Id at 35, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 621. "It does not further the effective administration ofjustice
for a court, on the basis of its own subjective reasons, to simply bar the use of otherwise valid
relevant evidence." Id
18. 133 Cal. App. 3d 24, 183 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1982).
19. See id at 33, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
20. See United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1386 (S.D. Calif. 1972).
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The search for truth through the use of external devices is hardly
new.2  Controversy surrounding the methods used to discover the ve-
racity of a person suspected of lying is also not unusual.22 To under-
stand the often virulent debate surrounding the use of the polygraph,
however, requires an examination of the history and the underlying
theory of polygraphy. The sections which follow present, in an intro-
ductory form, the nature of the science of polygraphy, the procedures
used in polygraphic examinations, and the treatment of the polygraph
by the courts.
POLYGRAPHIC EVIDENCE: AN OVERVIEW
A. The Theory of Polygraphy
The basic assumption underlying the theory of polygraphy is that
there are "voices" in the human body which, if properly elicited, can
reveal to the trained observer the degree of truth in a person's state-
ment.23 The proponents of polygraphy believe that
"Guilt carries Fear always about with it; there is a Tremor in the
Blood of a Thief, that, if attended to, would effectually discover him
... a fluttering Heart, an unequal Pulse, a sudden Palpitation shall
evidently confess he is the Man, in spite of a bold Countenance or a
false Tongue."24
These internal truth tellers are certain physiological reactions, the
involuntary result of a conscious attempt at deception. 25  These reac-
tions are measured and displayed on a "polygraph", or "machine of
multiple graphs" 26 as tracks, their patterns are interpreted by the poly-
graph operator, and a conclusion is drawn on the veracity of the sub-
ject's verbal responses.2 7
Polygraphic theory is founded on three basic assumptions. First,
polygraphers believe that the extent of the recorded changes in the
21. See LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 25-26. As an example of the enlightened methods of truth
detecting of the past, consider the method ascribed to the ancient Hindus. A person suspected of
lying was invited to chew a mouthful of rice and then attempt to spit it out upon a leaf from the
sacred Pipal tree. A man who successfully spat out the rice was deemed truthful, but if the rice
stuck to the subject's tongue or palate, he was adjudicated guilty. Id at 26.
22. See id at 25-27.
23. See id at 25.
24. Daniel Defoe, .n Effectual Scheme for the Immediate Prevention of Street Robberies and
Suppressing 411 Other Disorders of the Night (1730), quoted in LYKKEN, supra note I, at
frontispiece.
25. See generally LYKKEN, supra note I, at 37; United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp.
1377, 1380-1381, United States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (S.D. Calif. 1973); United
States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 512 (D. Maryland, 1973). The physiological reactions mea-
sured by the polygraph are the rate and depth of respiration, changes in blood pressure and pulse
rate, and galvanic skin response ("sweating of the palms"). See 348 F. Supp. at 1381; 361 F. Supp.
at 512.
26. 356 F. Supp. at 1365.
27. See LYKKEN, supra note I, at 37.
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physiological signals are governed by the subject's belief in the rele-
vance and importance of the questions asked.28 Second, polygraphers
assert that the telling of a lie will cause a greater deviation in the pat-
terns being recorded than the telling of the truth.29 Finally, detection
of a lie can be achieved by an examination of the responses to ques-
tions bearing the greatest relevance to the matter at issue,3° that is, the
crime the subject is suspected of committing.
The most widely-used polygraphic format in criminal investigation,
the "control question" test,32 was designed in recognition of these as-
sumptions. 33 The "control question" test is a combination of irrele-
vant, relevant, and so-called "lie control" questions.34 Irrelevant
questions deal with matters such as the subject's age, name, or place of
birth.35  The polygraphic responses to these questions should show a
lack of stress, as the matters raised are usually of no importance to the
investigation. 36  The relevant questions relate directly to the issue at
hand: "Did you kill X?" "Did you own the knife used to stab X?"
These questions usually go directly to the subject's guilt or innocence of
the crime charged.37 The "lie control" questions raise issues which,
28. See 356 F. Supp. at 1365.
29. I.d
30. Id
31. Id
32. See LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 109-127.
33. See id ;see also RASKIN, supra note 3, at 2. An outline of events at a typical polygraphic
examination is discussed at LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 11-22. The basic features of a "control
question" examination are: a) the "pre-test interview", at which the examiner discusses the ques-
tions he is going to ask the subject and frames their language in such a way as to make the subject
feel most comfortable with them, b) the "Stim" test, during which the examiner calibrates the
machine and establishes its credibility with the subject by letting the subject draw a card from a
deck of cards the examiner has rigged. The subject is instructed to answer "No" to every question
asked of him (example: "Is the card a red suit?" subject: "No." examiner: "Well, that looks like
a deceptive response." What the subject doesn't know is that all the cards in the deck were
hearts), and through the interchange of questions, the examiner correctly guesses the right card,
establishing in the mind of the subject that the polygraph is infallible, and c) the examination
itself, which, for accuracy's sake, is usually given three or four times. Id
34. See RASKIN, supra note 3, at 2. A typical series of questions might be like those quoted in
LYKKE, supra note 1, at I10:
In an examination of a subject accused of homicide by stabbing, the subject was asked by the
polygrapher of the British Columbia police:
1) Were you born in Hong Kong? (yes) (irrelevant)
2) Regarding the stabbing of Ken Chiu, do you intend to answer truthfully every question
about that? (yes) (sacrifice relevant)
3) Do you understand that I will ask only questions we have discussed? (yes) (outside issue)
4) During the first 18 years of your life, did you ever hurt someone? (no) (lie control)
5) Did you cut anyone with a knife on Dumfries St. on January 23, 1976? (no) (relevant)
6) Before 1974 did you ever try to seriously hurt someone? (no) (lie control)
7) Did you stab Ken Chiu on January 23, 1976? (no) (relevant)
8) Is your first name William? (yes) (irrelevant)
9) Before age 19, did you ever lie to get out of trouble? (no) (lie control)
10) Did you actually see Ken Chiu get stabbed? (no) (relevant)
35. See LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 109-10.
36. See id at 105.
37. See 356 F. Supp. 1363 at 1366.
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while unrelated to the specific crime itself, may be associated with un-
social conduct. They are designed to evoke high responses in innocent
persons: "During the first 18 years of your life, did you ever hurt some-
one?" "Before age 19, did you ever lie to get out of trouble? 3
The interrelationship of the responses to these questions is the key to
the perceived effectiveness of the polygraph test.39 According to the
theory of this examination, the subject will respond most violently to
the questions that are perceived to be the most threatening.40 There-
fore, a guilty person will show stronger reactions to the relevant ques-
tions relating to the crime, and much less reactions to the control
questions.4' Innocent persons should produce larger reactions to the
control questions than to the relevant questions.42 If the polygraphic
responses to the relevant questions are consistently larger than those
responses to the control questions, the subject has "failed the test" and
will be considered to have been deceptive.43 If the number of responses
to the control questions are the larger, then the subject has passed, and
will be deemed truthful.' If there is minimal difference between the
two sets of responses, the test is declared inconclusive.45
The theoretical basis of polygraphy rests squarely on the assumption
that a person's involuntary reactions are more trustworthy than his ob-
servable, conscious acts.' Opinions on the reliability and validity of
polygraphy divide at this stage at the practical application of the theory
of polygraphy.47
38. See LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 115, 356 F. Supp. 1363 at 1366.
39. See LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 115; see also United States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. at
1365.
40. See RASKIN, supra note 3, at 2. Of course, "threat" is a relative term, and critics say that
this generalization can be criticized on the grounds that the shaping of the "control" question, in
terms of wording and appropriateness, have much to do with how the subject reacts. In United
States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. 1363, the results of a polygraph examination favorable to defend-
ant were challenged on the grounds that the wording of the relevant question regarding the al-
leged sexual escapades of a suspected drug dealer was misleading (the question was, "Did you
deliberately lie to me when you said you had 'sex' with David (an undercover agent)?"), and that a
principal control question dealing with lies made to her mother when young was inappropriate
and confusing to the subject. Although the court raised the point, it did not give its conclusion on
the subject, and instead refused to admit the evidence on the bases of the traditional view that
polygraphic evidence was unreliable and would take up too much court time in considering expert
testimony on the point. d at 1366-67.
41. See RASKIN, supra note 3, at 2.
42. Id
43. LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 11; RAsIuN, supra note 3, at 2. The scoring technique used by
Raskin in his study was based on the strength or weakness of the three basic physiologic variables
in their reaction following the questioning of the subject. If the total score was six points or larger,
the subject was deemed truthful; if the score was negative six points or larger, the subject was
deemed deceptive, and scores falling in between the two extremes were called inconclusive. RAs-
KIN, supra note 3, at 2.
44. LYKKEN, supra note 1, at II1.
45. Id; see also 356 F. Supp. at 1365.
46. See LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 113-118.
47. See id; see also RAsKIN, supra note 3, at 2.
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B. The Reliability of Polygraphic Evidence
No one is quite sure how many polygraphic examinations are given
in America every year. A conservative estimate would place the
number at one million." Others would put the figure nearer to four
million.4 9 A substantial portion of these figures represent the use of the
polygraph in a criminal setting,5" where the innocence or guilt of a per-
son is allegedly determined." The most common situation, however,
in which the average person is subjected to polygraphic examination is
in the employment setting. 2 Approximately twenty percent of major
American corporations, and fifty percent of retail sales organizations,
use the polygraph in preemployment decisions or in periodic screenings
for employee impropriety.5 3 To administer these tests, thirteen major
polygraphic schools graduate hundreds of new examiners every year.
In 1979, approximately 4,000 to 7,000 persons were practicing in the
polygraphic field.5 4
In the face of wide-spread use, many persons have come to believe in
the infallibility of the polygraph. 5 The polygraph has gained the repu-
tation as a "truth teller",56 a "truth verifier", and a veritable Houdini
which can always reveal truth. Others claim that polygraphy has be-
come an American obsession, a pseudo-scientific game of cat and
mouse with the rights of criminal suspects played for very high stakes. 7
Polygraphic evidence, to be admissible in a court of law, must be
found valid .5  To find polygraphy reliable, judges must be convinced
48. LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 1-2.
49. This figure was calculated by extrapolating figures cited by the president of the Florida
Polygraph Association, which calculated the number of tests given in Florida annually to be in
excess of 100,000, and multiplying it across the 50 states. Id at 2.
50. Id at 2.
51. Id
52. Id at 3. Both critics and supporters of polygraphic evidence are concerned at the rise of
polygraph testing in the personnel offices and security investigations of America's businesses.
Even David Raskin criticizes the results of the business polygraph test, saying that such tests are
often conducted hastily and that the questions asked, usually very vague and general, are designed
to elicit personal admissions that can be used against the subject when personnel decisions are
made. On this point, see the brief discussion in Meyer, Do Lie Detectors Lie?, SCIENCE 82, June
1982, at 24, 27; see also Flaherty, Po,ygraphs: The Big Lie?, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 24, 1983, at 1, col. I.
53. LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 3. Presently, there are no laws either banning the use of lie
detectors in the business area, or establishing licensing requirements, in 15 states. Polygraph ex-
ams are permitted in 21 states which have polygraph licensing statutes. 16 states and the District
of Columbia impose some type of prohibition on the use of the polygraph in the business setting.
Two states enforce partial bans and require licenses. See Flaherty, supra note 52, at 28, col. 1; see
also Belt & Holden, Polygraph Usage Among Major U.S. Corporations, PERSONNEL JOURNAL,
1978, at 80-86.
54. See LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 1.
55. See United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 1360 (9th Cir. 1975).
56. See id
57. See Meyer, Do Lie Detectors Lie?, SCIENCE 82, June 1982, at 24, 26.
58. See LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 70. "The lie test diagnosis may be unambiguous; the im-
portant question is whether it is correct." Id
1118
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that the theory behind polygraphy, i.e., that certain physiological reac-
tions can be interpreted by a capable polygrapher and be used to deter-
mine truth or falsity, can be proven to be accurate. 9
Numerous studies have been conducted which claim to prove the ac-
curacy of polygraphic testing. ° Most of these reports do not focus on
the accuracy of the polygraph machine itself.6 ' There seems to be gen-
eral agreement that the polygraph, as an instrument for measuring and
recording the critical physiological signals, is an accurate and legiti-
mate tool.6 2 Instead, criticism and praise are focused on the validity of
the conclusions drawn from the polygraphic examination. 63  Propo-
nents of polygraphy have claimed accuracy figures ranging from 70% to
100%." John E. Reid, who is credited with creating the "lie control"
polygraphic examination, and Professor Fred Inbau, a criminal law au-
thority and director of the Chicago Crime Laboratory for many years,
have conducted extensive studies of the accuracy of polygraphic tests. 5
They assert that, based on their experiences with administering over
100,000 examinations, a properly conducted polygraph test will be cor-
rect 99% of the time.6
In a recent report for the National Institute of Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice,67 polygraph expert Professor David C. Raskin of the
University of Utah examined the results of laboratory experiments and
field studies of polygraphic examinations. 8 Mr. Raskins's efforts were
aimed at determining if the conclusions of truth or innocence reached
through polygraphic examinations were valid generalizations useful in
a defense of polygraphy against claims of inaccuracy. 69 The report
59. See id
60. See id at 64-67, Skolnick, Scientofc Theory and Scientpfc Evidence: An Analysis of Lie
Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694, 699 (1961), Lester, Polygraph Evidence: Are the Courts Failing to Keep
Abreast of Modern Technology, 5 CRIM. Jus. J. 33, 48 (1981), Burack, A Critical Analysis of the
Theory, Method, and Limitations of the "Lie Detector", 46 J. CRAM. L., C. & P.S. 414, 421-22
(1955).
61. See LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 112-26.
62. See 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1381.
63. Id
64. See LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 65. "IN]early every experienced polygraphic examiner who
has recorded an opinion about the accuracy of tests he has himself administered has chosen an
estimate in [the 100% range], where 95% is "conservative" and 99% is perhaps typical." Id; see
also 361 F. Supp. 510, at 512.
A fair statement is that while studies conducted by private and governmental organiza-
tions assess the validity and reliability of the technique at 70% to 95%, the systematic
research relating to the validity of polygraphy is still in its formative period and is
ongoing.
Id
65. J. REID & F.E. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPION, THE POLYGRAPH ("LIE DETECTOR")
TECHNIQUE, 31 (2nd ed. 1977).
66. Id at 304.
67. RASKIN, supra note 3.
68. Id at 1, 8-22.
69. Id
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stressed the advantages of laboratory experiments in assessing the accu-
racy of results.7" In the laboratory, "ground truth"' can be estab-
lished, and can be used as the standard by which to measure the
results.7" Using ground truth, different test structures were evaluated
for their relative truth-determining abilities,73 and the influence of
characteristics held by the subject were examined.74
The report analyzed the results of two separately conducted experi-
ments using the "lie control" examination technique.7 5 In both experi-
ments, test results were scored once by the examiner and again by an
independent polygrapher.7 6 The examiners used an objective numeri-
cal system according point values to the results of each of the three
physiological components measured by the machine. In the first exper-
iment, an accuracy rate of 95% was achieved.77 The second experiment
yielded an 89% accuracy figure, and the combined accuracy rates, as
compared with established ground truth, exceeded 90%.78 The charts
from the second experiment were examined by an independent exam-
iner. This independent scoring revealed a 100% agreement between the
polygraphers on the results of their conclusions. This is strong evi-
dence supporting the report's position advocating the use of a numeri-
cal system of scoring which will ensure that any polygrapher can look
at any set of responses and come up with the same result.79
The report also undertook to meet common criticisms of polygraphy
through the use of field studies in the criminal setting. 0 A number of
studies were conducted, each focusing on a particular area of critical
70. Id at 1.
71. Ground truth is factual truth that can be completely and certainly determined in the
laboratory setting. Id at 1.
72. Id
73. Id
74. Id Raskin first examined the results of two experiments conducted separately at a pro-
vincial prison in British Columbia and at the University of Utah. Both experiments used a "mock
crime" situation, where half of the subjects in each experiment were instructed to commit a
"crime" while the other half were merely informed of the nature of the crime. The polygraph
examinations were given by an examiner with no knowledge as to the guilt or innocence of the
subjects. Id
75. I at I. For purposes of the experiment, all the subjects in both projects were instructed
to deny having committed the theft, and were offered a cash bonus if they could produce truthful
results on the test. Id
76. ld at 1.
77. ld at 8.
78. Id at 8. The other 10%, deemed inconclusive, were the result of errors in scoring, divided
between "false positives" (an erratic response to a relevant question by an innocent person, indi-
cating untruth) and "false negatives" (a lower response than expected to a relevant question by a
guilty subject). Id
79. Id at 11.
80. Id at 1. Dr. Raskin stated that questions concerning the everyday practice of polygraphy
could be answered solely by the generalizations arrived at through laboratory experimentation.
Raskin indicated his preference that these questions be answered through studies of field applica-
tions, as inferences drawn from the laboratory should be made cautiously and be fully tested in
the field before considered accurate. Id
1120
1983 / Polygraph Admissibility
concern.8  These concerns, the methods used to meet them, and the
test results are summarized below.
L Reliability and Validity of the "Lie Control" Examination with
Criminal Suspects
A concern of polygraph critics has been with the differences in results
between claimed laboratory accuracy and actual field results.82 One
study was designed to attempt to remove differences between labora-
tory and field practices by imposing strict controls on the subjects, ex-
aminers, and techniques used in the field examinations. 83 Ninety-two
criminal suspects were examined at the request of police, defense and
prosecuting attorneys. 84 Results were numerically scored by the exam-
iner and by an independent polygrapher8 5 Ground truth was deter-
mined by comparing the test results with a combination of criteria: an
independent judgment of a five-member panel of experts, judicial out-
comes, and full confessions of guilt.86 When the polygraphic results
were compared with the decisions of the panel of experts as to guilt or
innocence, they agreed in 86% of the cases.8 7 When compared with the
judicial outcomes of the cases involving the subjects, there was 88%
agreement between the polygraph results and the judicial outcomes.88
The relevance of this study is in the closeness of the results determined
in the field with the accuracy figures determined in the laboratory ex-
periments, showing that polygraphic examinations, if conducted prop-
erly, can have similar success rates whenever conducted.89
2. Accuracy of Chart Interpretation
The first polygraph examinations gave great discretion to the exam-
iner to add to the objective results certain subjective factors arising out
of the examiner's own opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the sub-
ject. These early examination techniques have been referred to as the
81. See id at 4-7.
82. Id at 4.
83. Id at 4. Raskin admits the impossibility of eliminating all the differences between labo-
ratory and field exercises, but does conclude that a majority of the problems could be alleviated.
These problems included the differences in subject motivation and population, availability of in-
formation about the case which might influence the examiner, differences in techniques used by
the polygraphers, and the difference in training and experience between field practitioners and
laboratory researchers. See id
84. Id
85. Id
86. Id
87. d at 8.
88. Id at 10.
89. Id at 11.
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"clinical lie tests." 90 Criticism of these techniques led to the rise of the
modem "lie control" test, which eliminates all potentially prejudicial
factors, such as operator opinion, by requiring the test results to be
scored in a numerical fashion. The report argues that the major benefit
of the objective lie control test is that any polygrapher looking at the
results and using the same scoring technique would arrive at the same
result.9 To test this-hypothesis, polygraph results from sixteen crimi-
nal suspects examined using the lie control test were evaluated by 25
experienced polygraphers from a variety of backgrounds.92 Eighteen of
the polygraphers did not use the numerical scoring technique, seven
did.93 Of the 400 judgments made by the polygraphers on the sixteen
charts they scored, 79% were correct, 8% were errors, and 13% were
inconclusive.9 4 Looking to the difference in accuracy rates between the
scoring techniques, the average accuracy test of the 18 polygraphers
who did not score numerically was 88%, while the rate for the seven
who did was significantly higher, with an average of 99%, giving
credence to the view that numerical scoring leads to higher accuracy
and an increased reliability factor.9
5
3. The "Friendly Polygrapher"
One objection often raised by critics and courts96 is the possibility
that the polygraph results may be affected in cases where the examina-
tion is conducted at the request of defense attorneys.97 The motivation
to deceive on the part of the subject, and the threat of serious conse-
quences if such deceit were discovered, would be absent in the case of
examination by a "friendly polygrapher." Therefore, many critics as-
sert that the results obtained in these situations would be invalid.
98
Specifically, the critics fear that the subject's concern with the use of the
results of the test against him if found deceptive is missing in the
friendly polygrapher situation.99 This absence of the motivation to lie,
critics assert, will lead to results substantially different than results
90. For a discussion stating strong reasons to reject the results of the "clinical lie" test, see
LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 87-101.
91. See id at 85.
92. RASKIN, supra note 3, at 5.
93. Id at 11.
94. Id at 11. There was found no significant difference in accuracy of the decisions of exam-
iners with at least one year of experience (92%) and the decisions of those with less than one year
of experience (89%). Id
95. Id
96. See People v. Adams, 53 Cal. App. 3d 109, 116-118, 125 Cal. Rptr. 518, 523-524 (1975),
United States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (1973), M. ORNE, THE LEGAL ADMISSIBILITY
OF THE POLYGRAPH, 114-16 (1975).
97. See RASKIN, supra note 3, at 6; ORNE, supra note 96, at 114-16.
98. See 53 Cal. App. 3d at 117, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
99. See id at 116, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
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which would arise from examinations conducted by neutral examiners
or the police."° To test this hypothesis, three different groups of crimi-
nal suspects, evenly divided between subjects examined at the request
of law enforcement officials and by private defense attorneys, were
given polygraph examinations. 10 The results tended to disprove the
"friendly polygrapher" theory, for the percentage of responses deemed
truthful by the defense polygraphers, 78%, differed only slightly from
truthful responses given to the prosecution examiners, 76%.12
To be admissible in court, polygraphy must be shown to be reliable.
Experiments and field studies by polygraphers point to the conclusion
that polygraphic examinations using the "lie control" format are highly
accurate. 10 3 Numerical scoring of polygraph results produces a higher
rate of accuracy and reliability than other methods." Independent
evaluations of test results to verify the accuracy of the polygrapher's
conclusions are an important check on possible operator bias and guar-
antees objective results that can be relied upon by courts.'0 5
The proponents of polygraphy believe that an examination by a well-
trained and objective examiner, independently verified by a neutral
polygrapher, will result in a highly accurate and reliable determination
of guilt or innocence which should be given careful consideration in
criminal investigations and judicial proceedings.10 6 The modem poly-
graphic examination, it is urged, has a valuable potential not only for
the discovery of truth but for the protection of the innocent. 0 7
The polygraph does not speak absolute truth, but does supply at least
some evidence of a greater indication of truth than would have been
known without it.'0 8 While the results of a polygraph test should never
be used by itself to support a criminal conviction, the reliability of
polygraphic evidence supplies a compelling reason for its use in the
adversary system of justice.'0 9
The California courts, following the lead of the majority of Ameri-
100. RASKIN, supra note 3, at 6.
101. Id
102. Id at 21.
Contrary to the "friendly polygrapher" hypothesis, there was no difference in frequency
of truthful outcomes for defense and law enforcement examinations. . . the three sam-
ples of data obtained to test the predictions from the "friendly polygrapher" hypothesis
not only failed to produce any evidence to support that hypothesis, but some of the
results indicated effects which were totally contrary to Orne's speculations.
Id
103. Id at 23.
104. Id
105. I d at 25.
106. See id at 23-25.
107. See id at 25.
108. See id
109. See id at 23-25.
1123
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 14
can jurisdictions, have so far excluded the use of non-stipulated poly-
graph results in their courtrooms. 10 The California view may soon be
shifting, however, guided by the mandate expressed in the recently-ap-
proved "Victim's Bill of Rights," which would allow the introduction
of all relevant evidence in criminal proceedings."' And the courts
themselves, as shown by the Witherspoon decision, may be ready to
enter into a period of serious reevaluation of the acceptability of poly-
graphic evidence." 2 To better understand the possible change, an ex-
amination of the course of judicial treatment of polygraphy since its
introduction as an evidentiary technique over fifty years ago is
necessary.
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF POLYGRAPHIC EVIDENCE IN CALIFORNIA
The California approach to polygraphic evidence has been shaped to
a great extent by the seminal case of Frye v. United States.1 13 In Frye,
decided in 1923, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia up-
held the rejection by the trial court of the results of a systolic blood
pressure "lie detector" test."I4 The Frye court fashioned a standard to
govern the admissibility of scientific evidence, the "general acceptance"
test. This test requires any scientific principle serving as the basis for
evidence sought to be admitted to be so "sufficiently established (as) to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it be-
longs.""' 5 The principle must have "crosse(d) the line between the ex-
perimental and demonstrative stages", and must be afforded some sort
of scientific recognition by authorities in the relevant branch of science
before its evidential force will be recognized by the courts.1 6 The Frye
court concluded, in applying the "general acceptance" rule to poly-
graphic evidence, that the systolic blood pressure test had not yet
gained the requisite general acceptance by physiological and psycho-
logical authorities, and the results of the test should not be admissible
into evidence. 17
Under Frye, the proponent of polygraphic evidence must satisfy not
only the traditional requirements of relevancy and helpfulness to the
110. See infra text accompanying notes 113-49.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 150-68.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 170-209.
113. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
114. See id at 1014.
115. See id
116. Id
117. Id For an overview of the treatment of the Frye standard by American jurisdictions, see
Comment, Compulsory Process and Pol ygraphic Evidence: Does Exclusion Violate a Criminal De-
fendant's Due Process Rights?, 12 CONN. L. REv. 324, 336-44 (1980), and McCormick, Scien tiic
Evidence: D6fning a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REv. 879, 882-888 (1982).
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trier of fact,""8 but also must show that polygraphy has been generally
accepted by the scientific community." 9 This interpretation of Frye
has been widely applied by American jurisdictions. The main use of
the test has been in cases in which the admissibility of polygraph results
was at issue. 20 In most other areas of expert testimony based on scien-
tific evaluation, the courts have not required the same degree of "gen-
eral acceptance" as a prerequisite to admission as Frye requires of
polygraphic evidence.' 2' The major reason for this difference in treat-
ment seems to stem from judicial hostility to the polygraph.' 22 The
result of the use of the Frye test to determine the admissibility of poly-
graphic evidence has been the exclusion of polygraphs from the
courtroom. 1
23
A. Frye in California
The California courts have used the Frye "general acceptance" test
as the basis for their decisions regarding the admissibility of poly-
graphic evidence, and have excluded the introduction of testimony re-
garding the results of polygraph examinations. 124  In 1950, the
California Supreme Court held in People v. Wochnick125 that the re-
sults of a polygraphic examination were not admissible as evidence,
and there was prejudicial error for the trial judge to admit into evi-
dence the results of a polygraph test indirectly through the form of a
purported accusatory statement. 126 The Wochnick court cited Frye and
cases from other jurisdictions adopting the Frye standard. The court
118. See McCormick, supra note 117, at 881.
119. See Comment, supra note 117, at 337.
120. See, e.g., People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 127, 219 P.2d 70, 72 (1950), People v.
Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 206, 18 N.E.2d 31, 32,4 N.Y.S.2d 913, 914 (1938), Commonwealth v. Fatalo,
346 Mass. 266, 267-68, 191 N.E.2d 479, 480 (1963), Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 376-77, 37
N.W.2d 593, 597 (1949), Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339, 340 (Fla. 1953), McCormick, supra note
117, at 884.
121. See Commentsupra note 117, at 339-40. Examples of types of expert testimony based on
scientific evaluation which have been accepted by courts without a showing of the same degree of
"general acceptance" required of polygraphy are fingerprints, People v. Jennings, 252 IlL. 534, 96
N.E. 1077 (1911), ballistics, State v. Burney, 346 Mo. 859, 143 S.W.2d 273 (1940), and
spectographs, United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978). The distinction between
these types of scientific evidence and polygraphy is that in the former case, the court is examining
the results of a "scientific" test, while at issue in polygraphy cases are scientific facts. Comment,
supra note 117, at 339.
122. See generally Witherspoon v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d 24, 29, 183 Cal. Rptr. 615,
618 (1982).
123. For a summary of the California approach to the Frye standard, see Lister, Polygraphic
Evidence: Are the Courts Failing to Keep Abreast of Modern Technology?, CRIM. Jus. J. 33, 41-45
(1981).
124. See Lister, supra note 123, at 41. California courts will, however, accept the introduction
of polygraphic evidence into testimony by the stipulation of both parties. See People v. Houser,
85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 694-95, 193 P.2d 937, 942 (1948).
125. 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P.2d 70 (1950).
126. Id at 127, 219 P.2d at 72.
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declared California to be "in accord" with the view that the systolic
blood pressure deception test had not yet "gained such standing and
scientific recognition as to justify the admission of expert testimony de-
duced from tests made under such theory."' 27
The California courts have supported their use of the Frye standard
in excluding polygraphic evidence with several policy arguments. In
the California Supreme Court case of People v. Kelly,' 28 assessing the
admissibility and validity of voiceprint evidence, the Court defended
its continued use of the Frye test, pointing to the benefits of the "con-
servative nature" of the "general acceptance" test.' 29  Uniformity of
decisions on the admissibility of scientific evidence "generally ac-
cepted" by the scientific community, 30 and the avoidance of jury reli-
ance on scientific proof such as polygraphic evidence which can assume
a "posture of mystic infallibility", '3' were benefits found by the Kelly
court of continued adherence to the Frye test.'32
Besides uniformity of decisions and the prevention of misplaced jury
reliance on scientific evidence, the California courts have pointed to the
nature of polygraphic evidence itself as a reason for continued exclu-
sion. The judicial opinion that "lie detector tests do not as yet have
enough reliability to justify the admission of expert testimony based on
their results" has remained unchanged. 33 While the Frye "general ac-
ceptance" requirement is the primary reason for refusing to admit poly-
graphic evidence, the reliability of the lie detector test has been deemed
to be a far more important factor to consider in the admissibility of
polygraphic evidence. 34 In People v. Adams, 135 the California Court of
Appeals expressed its view that "general acceptance is not necessarily a
proper test [of admissibility] since it does not invariably equate with
reliability."' 36  Proponents must establish that polygraphic evidence
has "a degree of reliability sufficient to warrant admissibility."'
37
127. Id at 128, 219 P.2d at 72.
128. 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
129. Id at 31-32, 549 P.2d at 1244-45, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49.
130. Id at 31, 549 P.2d at 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
131. Id at 31-32, 549 P.2d at 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
132. Id at 31, 549 P.2d at 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
133. See People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 752, 312 P.2d 665, 674 (1951).
134. In People v. Jones, 52 Cal. 2d 636, 343 P.2d 577 (1959), the California Supreme Court
held that a lack of scientific certainty as to the truth or falsity of the answers given during a
polygraphic examination makes the results of a lie detector test inadmissible for or aganist a crimi-
nal defendant. Id at 643, 343 P.2d at 588.
135. 53 Cal. App. 3d 109, 125 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1975).
136. Id at 115, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 522. TheAdams court engaged in a lengthy review of federal
and state decisions dealing with the admissibility of polygraphic evidence to support the exclusion
of the proffered polygraph results before it. See id at 114, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 521 (citing United
States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510 (D.Md. 1973), United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.
Mich. 1972), and United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1972)).
137. Id at 115-119, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 522-25. The Adams court, in finding the polygraphic
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Another judicial concern with the introduction of polygraphic evi-
dence is the fear that the polygraph examination of an innocent person
"may record as a lie what is in fact the truth. s138 For this reason, evi-
dence of the willingness or unwillingness of a criminal suspect to take a
lie detector test is inadmissible.1 39  A final factor considered by the
courts has been the absence of evidence regarding the methods or qual-
ifications of the operator of the polygraph.140 In any case dealing with
polygraphy, the extent of operator experience and proven competency
are important factors showing the reliability of the polygraph itself' 4'
The California courts, in their dealings with polygraphic evidence,
have not only continued the use of a Frye-type "general acceptance"
analysis, but have formulated various policy reasons which have been
transmuted into further requirements to be met before polygraph ex-
amination results can be admitted.142  In the rare case in which the
courts have gone beyond the holding of Frye to examine the rationale
behind exclusion, polygraphic evidence has been found to be unworthy
of judicial recognition because the proponents of the evidence have
failed to show that polygraphy has gained that degree of reliability suf-
ficient to warrant its admission. 143 The continued viability of the tradi-
tional California treatment of polygraphy is now at issue in the courts
and in the Legislature.'"
THE FUTURE OF POLYGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
A major reason for this reevaluation is the effect the recently-enacted
"Victims' Bill of Rights"'4 5 is having on California evidentiary juris-
evidence before it to be unreliable, cited the following reasons supporting its conclusion: (1) de-
fendant took his examination from a "friendly polygrapher", (2) defendant had consumed alcohol
and pills several hours before the accident in question in the case, casting doubts as to his ability
to recall the incident and generate meaningful polygraphic response, (3) defendant had ingested a
tranquilizing drug some hours before the polygraphic examination, thereby affecting the physio-
logical responses he displayed at the time of the exam, and (4) defendant, a physician, may have
been able to use his specialized knowledge of physiology to "beat the test". id at 115-16, 118-19,
125 Cal. Rptr. at 522, 524-25.
138. See People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737 at 752, 312 P.2d 665 at 674 (1951).
139. Id at 752, 312 P.2d at 674.
140. See People v. Aragon, 154 Cal. App. 2d 646 at 658, 316 P.2d 370 at 378 (1957).
141. See infra text accompanying notes 270-293.
142. See People v. Adams, 53 Cal. App. 3d 109, 115, 125 Cal. Rptr. 518, 522 (1975).
143. See id
144. See Ashby, Legislature May Change Prop. 8"s Evidentiary Rules, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 7,
1983, at 1, col. 6. Two bills have been introduced in an attempt to restore non-controversial
evidence provisions "wiped out" by the passage of Proposition 8. Senate Bill 242 restores the
Evidence Code with the exception of section 788, which deals with the use of prior convictions, a
subject proscribed elsewhere in Proposition 8. Senate Bill 243 restores the Financial Privacy Act,
certain sections of the Penal Code, and other miscellaneous sections from other codes dealing with
such things as speed traps and dependency child hearings. Id
145. See Proposition 8 (Victim's Bill of Rights), California Ballot Initiative, Primary Election
1982, reprinted in Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 300, 651 P.2d 274, 313, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30,
69 (1982).
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prudence. 46 Judges and legislators alike are struggling with the ramifi-
cations of the "Truth in Evidence" clause of Proposition 8, which
would seem to signal an expansion of admissible evidence into areas
heretofore considered unreliable or misleading.' 4  Another factor sig-
naling a possible change in attitude toward polygraphic evidence is the
recent decision in Witherspoon v. Superior Court, 48 which indicates a
judicial willingness to reconsider the polygraph question.' 49
A. Proposition 8: The Victims' Bill of Rights
Proposition 8, enacted into law by the voters of California in June,
1982,150 was one of the most wide-ranging and controversial ballot
measures ever considered by the California electorate.' 5' The support-
ers of the measure hailed the "Bill of Rights" as a decisive action
against violent crime, 5 2 and an attempt to restore balance to the rules
governing the use of evidence.' 53 The detractors of Proposition 8 were
quick to label the initiative as an ill-conceived measure, 54 a simplistic
and short-sighted proposal 55 which would needlessly reduce personal
liberties by making radical changes in the state Constitution.
56
One provision in the "conglomeration of proposals" making up
Proposition 8 was the so-called "truth-in-evidence" section.' 57  This
provision states that, except for statutory exclusions created by a two-
thirds vote of the California Legislature after the passage of the initia-
tive, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceed-
ing 58  This change, in effect, removes the judicially-created rules
146. See Ashby, supra note 144, at 1, col. 6.
147. See id
148. See 133 Cal. App. 3d 24, 31, 183 Cal. Rptr. 615, 621.
149. See infra text accompanying notes 170-209.
150. See Ashby, supra note 144, at 1, col. 6. The proposition was approved by 57 percent of
the California voters. Id
151. See 32 Cal. 3d at 305-06, 651 P.2d at 318-19, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75.
152. 32 Cal. 3d at 305, 651 P.2d at 318, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (quoting from ballot argument by
then-Lieutenant Governor Mike Curb).
153. Id at 305, 651 P.2d at 318, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (quoting from ballot argument by then-
Attorney General and present California Governor George Deukmejian).
154. Id at 306, 651 P.2d at 319, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 75 (quoting from ballot argument by Rich-
ard Gilbert, Stanley Roden, and Terry Goggin).
155. Carrizosa, State Bar President Raps 'Victims' Bill of Rights', L.A. Daily J., May 17, 1982,
at 2, col. 3.
156. 32 Cal. 3d at 306, 651 P.2d at 319, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 75 (quoting ballot argument by
Gilbert, Roden, and Goggin).
157. Ashby,Anti-Crime Plan Halfway Toward '82 Ballot Spot, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 9, 1982, at
1, col. 6; see CAL. CONST. art. 1, §28(d).
158. See CAL. CO NST. art. I, §28(d). This rule is not to be applied to effect any existing statu-
tory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, statutory or constitutional rights of the press,
or certain Evidence Code sections relating to the discretionary exclusion powers of the trial judge
and procedures relating to the admission of evidence of sexual conduct used to impeach a witness
in certain criminal prosecutions. See id; CAL. EVID. CODE §§352, 782, 1103. This rule is to be
extended to include pretrial and post conviction hearings and motions, and any trial or hearing of
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excluding certain types of evidence,' 59 including polygraphic
evidence. 160
The Office of the California Attorney General has suggested that the
"truth-in-evidence" portion of Proposition 8 is in conffict with that por-
tion of Evidence Code section 801 barring an expert from basing his
opinion on matters "precluded by law."' 16 1 Courts, under the provi-
sions of "truth-in-evidence", would be required to admit all relevant
evidence supported by the testimony of a qualified expert witness, un-
less the probative value of the evidence is "overborne by the familiar
dangers of prejudicing the jury, and undue consumption of time." 162 If
prejudice is discovered, courts would keep the evidence out through the
use of the court's discretion under Evidence Code Section 352.163
In the absence of legislation regulating or forbidding the admission
of polygraphic evidence,"6 the thrust of the "truth-in-evidence" provi-
sion 165 would indicate that polygraphic evidence may serve as a valid
basis on which an expert can base an opinion.166 There can be no doubt
that an accurate, reliable polygraph examination can serve as the basis
for relevant evidence in a judicial determination of guilt or inno-
cence.' 67 If the relevance of the polygraph results outweigh any poten-
tial prejudice the presentation of the evidence would create in the
minds of the trier of fact, there would be little preventing polygraphic
evidence from being introduced into evidence. The "Victims' Bill of
Rights", if it means nothing else, seems to require this result.' 68
If polygraphic evidence is admissible under the evidentiary scheme
outlined by Proposition 8's "truth-in-evidence" clause, only stare deci-
sis reliance on the California cases following Frye and the implicit judi-
cial reticence to admit polygraph results would seem to stand in the
way. Signals that the judicial edifice is weakening in the area of exclu-
sion of polygraphic evidence have been sent out by the recent decision
ajuvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Federal restrictions on
the admission of evidence are not affected. CAL. CONST. art. 1, §28(d).
159. See Truth-in-Evidence: California Law In Turmoil, 69 A.B.A. J. 32 (1983).
160. CALIFORNIA ATrORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, A GUIDE TO PROPOSITION 8, at 4-46 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as GUIDE].
161. See id at 4-15 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE §801(b)).
162. See id at 4-47; see also C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE 491 (2nd ed. 1972).
163. See GUIDE, supra note 160, at 4-47.
164. See Witherspoon v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d 24, 34-35, 183 Cal. Rptr. 615, 621
(1982).
165. See Ashby, supra note 144.
166. See 133 Cal. App. 3d at 33, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
167. See id at 33, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
168. See Ashby, supra note 144. While the main intent of Proposition 8 was to eliminate the
growing gap between state and federal courts over application of constitutional standards in
search questions under the Fourth Amendment, a secondary purpose was to abolish restrictions
on evidence heretofore kept out of the courtroom because ofjudicially-created exclusionary rules.
Id
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of the California Court of Appeals in Witherspoon v. Superior Court.169
If this case is any indication of the future course of polygraphic evi-
dence in the courtrooms of California, then the future is bright indeed
for the proponents of polygraphy.
B. Witherspoon v. Superior Court
Until the decision of Witherspoon v. Superior Court,' California
courts had followed an unbroken line of appellate decisions which cre-
ated a blanket exclusion of polygraphic evidence. 17 ' The Witherspoon
decision, however, reexamined this course of judicial treatment of po-
lygraphy172 and concluded that no legal reasons existed to justify the
continuance of the exclusionary policy of the courts.
17 3
Defendant Gary Witherspoon was awaiting trial on eight counts of
armed robbery. 174 Pursuant to procedures outlined in California Evi-
dence Code section 402, Witherspoon requested a pretrial determina-
tion of the admissibility of a confession alleged to have been made by
him.17  He also sought an evidentiary hearing, at which he proposed to
prove the validity of a polygraphic examination administered to him on
the issues of the voluntariness of the confession and his innocence of
the crimes with which he was charged, for future admission at trial.'
7 6
The trial court denied the motion, refusing to hold the evidentiary
hearing on the grounds that the polygraph examination results would
be inadmissible regardless of what evidence the defendant might of-
fer. 177 Witherspoon petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of man-
date to require the trial court to hold the evidentiary hearing. 78 The
appellate court directed the issuance of the writ of mandate, holding
that polygraphic evidence meeting the requirements set forth in Evi-
dence Code sections 402 through 406 (relating to judicial determination
of existence of preliminary facts required before proffered evidence can
169. 133 Cal. App. 3d 24, 183 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1982).
170. See id
171. Id at 26, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 113-149.
173. 133 Cal. App. 3d at 27, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
174. Id at 26, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
175. California Evidence Code section 402 provides:
(a) When the existence of a preliminary fact is disputed, its existence or nonexistence
shall be determined as provided in this article. (b) The court may hear and determine
the question of the admissibility of evidence out of the presence of the jury; but in a
criminal action, the court shall hear and determine the question of the admissibility of a
confession or admission of the defendant out of the presence and hearing of the jury if
any party so requests. (c) A ruling on the admissibility of evidence implies whatever
finding of fact is prerequisite thereto; a separate or formal finding is unnecessary unless
required by statute.
176. 133 Cal. App. 3d at 26, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
177. Id at 26, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
178. ld
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be presented to the trier of fact) should be admitted.179 The traditional
discretionary authority of the trial judge under Evidence Code section
352 to exclude prejudicial or overly time consuming evidence would be
preserved and could be used to prevent the admission of polygraphic
evidence falling within the purview of the section.'
In analyzing the California cases dealing with the polygraph prob-
lem, 8 ' Judge Compton, writing for the Witherspoon court, found that
many of the cases which applied the Frye test based their exclusion of
polygraphic evidence "on #7se dixit statements that the 'reliability of
the results of a polygraph examination has not been established' and
that 'courts . . . have consistently denied their admission into evi-
dence.' "I82 Judge Compton credited this to the futility of the attempt
to introduce evidence of polygraph reliability in the face of the widely
accepted exclusionary rule of Frye.183 A lack of understanding on the
part of judges of the theory and practical uses of polygraphy, according
to Judge Compton, led to a "knee jerk" subjective reaction among
judges which favored the foes of polygraphic evidence in an area in
which "there is a substantial and credible body of opinion on both sides
of the question."" 4
Judge Compton begins his opinion by removing the court from the
restraints of the Frye test.'8 5 Citing the lack of judicial understanding
of polygraphy, Judge Compton points to the failure of the case law to
identify in "just what 'scientific field' the necessary 'acceptance' must
be achieved."' 8 6 Were the Frye test to be applied in this case, however,
Judge Compton expresses no doubts that its "general acceptance" re-
quirement would be met, observing that the ability of the polygraph to
measure the physiological activities which serve as the basis for "lie
detecting" has not been disputed and is generally accepted in the scien-
tific community.' 7 Furthermore, the underlying theory of polygraphy
has its roots in the field of psychology, a discipline long accepted by the
courts as a recognized field of expertise.'
81
The court next considered the arguments (1) that polygraphic evi-
179. CAL. EVID. CODE §§402-406.
180. California Evidence Code section 352 provides:
The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption
of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.
181. 133 Cal. App. 3d at 28-29, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 617-18.
182. Id at 28, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
183. Id
184. Id at 29, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
185. Id
186. Id
187. Id at 32, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
188. Id at 33, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
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dence is unreliable, (2) that there is the chance that the machine or the
operator may make a mistake and read a person's innocent reactions as
guilty responses, or (3) that a person may beat the polygraph through
the use of various physiological techniques, throwing the validity of the
polygraph results into question.'8 9 The court declined to strike down
polygraphic evidence on these points, saying that the test is validated
by the common experiences of individuals within a normal range of
intellectual capacity and character. 190 "Who but the most virtuous
among us," writes Judge Compton, "can honestly say that they never
experienced the rapid breathing, sweating in the palms of the hands
and the feeling of 'flushing' in the face connected with an attempt to
deceive in even the most innocuous of situations?"' 91 As to the possi-
bility of error in the case of a "test beater", the court states that "no one
has contended that the polygraph is fool proof under all circumstances
. ..but what scientific or technical process is?' 1 92
The court next discussed the relevance of polygraphic evidence in the
trial setting, citing California Evidence Code section 210,191 which de-
fines "relevant evidence" as evidence "having any tendency in reason
to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action."' 94 The court found no specific reasons
which would support a finding of irrelevancy, noting that the trend in
the case law indicated that polygraphic evidence was excluded on pol-
icy grounds other than immateriality. '9 Absent a positive rule of evi-
dence, a constitutional provision requiring exclusion, 196 or legislatively-
created procedural schemes limiting the use of polygraphic evidence, 197
Judge Compton concluded that the effective administration of justice
would not be furthered by simply barring the use of otherwise valid,
relevant evidence.' 98 Relevance, of course, would still need to be estab-
lished in each case by the party proffering the polygraphic evidence, 199
and the trial judge still has discretion to exclude evidence deemed to be
inordinately time consuming or overly prejudicial .2°
The question of the admissibility of polygraphic evidence presented
no difficulties for the Witherspoon court, which considered the argu-
189. Id
190. Id
191. Id
192. Id at 34, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
193. CAL. EVID. CODE §210.
194. Id
195. 133 Cal. App. 3d at 31, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
196. Id at 34, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
197. Id at 35, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
198. Id
199. See id at 34, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
200. See id at 30, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
1132
1983 / Polygraph Admissibility
ments for and against admissibility as "simply matters of proof to be
developed by the opposing sides."2 ° The possibly prejudicial elements
of the evidence, Judge Compton suggested, could be dealt with through
the presentation of the conflicting evidence to the trier of fact under
proper limiting instructions. 20 2 As the novelty of the introduction
wears off, the court suggested that any jury tendency to place undue
emphasis on polygraph results will lessen as well.2"' Polygraphic evi-
dence will then be treated in the same manner by juries as other forms
of scientific or medical evidence are dealt with at the present time.2°
The conclusion of the Witherspoon court that the blanket exclusion
of polygraphic evidence should not be continued 2 5 rests on two basic
policies. First, the philosophy of the California Evidence Code is to
encourage the greater admissibility of evidence.206 This is amplified by
the "Victims' Bill of Rights" policy requiring the admissibility of all
relevant evidence.207 Secondly, there is the compelling need for evi-
dence to aid in an effective search for the truth, the most important of
all judicial functions.208
The Witherspoon case effectively interrupts that "unbroken chain" of
precedents which has kept polygraphic evidence out of the courtrooms
of California since the time of the Frye opinion. Witherspoon stands
alone as a signpost indicating an alternate path courts may take in this
"most important and vexed area"209 of the law. The reverberating ef-
fect of this decision must await the judgment of the future.
C An Indication of the Future
Witherspoon indicates the potential for change in the California view
of polygraphic evidence.210 There are, as yet, still many problems asso-
ciated with the polygraph which remain judicially unresolved.211
201. Id at 34, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
202. Id
203. Id
204. Id
205. Id at 29, 34, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 618, 621.
206. Id at 29, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 618. "Stated another way, the rules of evidence are essentially
rules of exclusion rather than admissibility. All relevant evidence is admissible unless there is a
positive rule of evidence which excludes it." Id at 30, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 150-168.
208. Id at 34-35, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
209. Id at 37, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 623 (Gates, J., concurring).
210. As of this writing, no case has yet cited or commented upon the Witherspoon decision.
The possible ramifications of the Witherspoon case have been discussed in print. A UCLA psy-
chologist has predicted that if the case is followed, costs to the state will increase (due to longer
trials) and justice will not be served by the admission of polygraphic evidence. Stringent regula-
tions were suggested as a possible solution. See Barber, Lie Detectors In The Courtroonv Do They
Really Tell The Truth?, Sacramento Bee, Feb. 23, 1983, §B, at 9, col. 1.
211. The admission of polygraphic evidence might have an effect on a criminal defendant's
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The United States Supreme Court, in dicta
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There are the opinions of judges to be changed. Judges fear that the
admission of polygraphic evidence will mislead the jury.212 There is
the concern that juries will be swept away by the "aura of scientific
conclusiveness" the polygraph emanates. 21 3 Judges worry that the jury
will be forced to witness countless battles of the experts on the relative
merits of polygraphy 14 that will inevitably consume a great deal of
time.215
The rules of evidence dealing with relevancy, and the discretionary
exclusionary powers of the judiciary should serve as adequate checks
on the misuse and abuses some claim are inherent in the polygraph.216
Legislative action may establish appropriate rules and regulations on
the introduction of polygraphic evidence, or may even explicitly ban
the polygraph from the courts forever.2 17 Courts will continue to apply
existing evidentiary rules to exclude opinion testimony of unqualified
experts,218 the proffering of opinions lacking a proper basis or founda-
219tion, or evidence proffered without showing the existence of a neces-
from its decision in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), has indicated that requiring a
defendant to submit to a polygraph examination would violate this right. Presumably, a defend-
ant could not be forced by the state to take a polygraph test absent a waiver of the suspect's fifth
amendment rights. See Comment, supra note 117, at 348-49. Another right affected by the intro-
duction of polygraphic evidence may be the sixth amendment's provision for compulsory process.
This right entitles defendants to call and present witnesses whose testimony is reliable and crucial
to the defense. If polygraphic testimony is found to be reliable, and since the results of the test, if
favorable to the defendant, would be crucial to their defense, the sixth amendment may require
the admittance of such evidence. See Comment, supra note 117, at 351.
212. See Comment, Commonwealth v. Vitello: 7he Role of the Polygraph in Criminal Trials,
15 NEw ENG. L. REv. 837, 850 (1980). This article supports the traditional non-admissibility
stance of most courts on this point, stating that the strong possibility of prejudice which would
arise from the introduction of the evidence can not be ameliorated by the "erroneous, or inade-
quate, or at the very best quite confusing" limiting instructions that supporters of polygraphic
evidence say should suffice. See id For an opposing viewpoint, see Comment, supra note 117, at
347. This comment suggests that the benefits of cross examination and the appropriate jury in-
structions can alleviate any problems raised by polygraphic evidence, and prevent it from usurp-
ing the jury's function as fact finder. See id
213. Comment, supra note 117, at 346. This viewpoint can be questioned in the light of the
nearly universal practice of admitting polygraphic evidence on the stipulation of both parties.
Little difference in evidentiary effect can be found between juror examination of stipulated evi-
dence and examination of the exact same evidence submitted to the jury after a lengthy discussion
of its reliability and veracity in an adversary setting. See id
214. See Witherspoon v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d at 36, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 622-23.
Judge Gates, in his concurring opinion, suggested that the Legislature "promptly move to estab-
lish what it perceives to be the truly appropriate rules, regulations, restrictions or out right bans"
on polygraphic evidence to avoid this, and many other, problems. Id at 37, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
215. See comment, supra note 212, at 851-52. The main objections cited therein are that the
necessary prerequisites for establishing the reliability of the particular examination-the subject
was in a testable condition, the examination conditions were proper, the test was properly admin-
istered-will further burden an already clogged judicial system. Id But see Comment, supra note
117, at 347-48, which says that the consumption of court time is not a sufficiently compelling state
interest to outweigh the criminal defendant's due process rights to present his defense and chal-
lenge the prosecution's case against him. See id at 347.
216. See 133 CaL. App. 3d at 29-30, 34, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19.
217. See id at 37, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 623 (Gates, J., concurring).
218. See CAL. EVID. CODE §801.
219. See id §803.
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sary preliminary fact.22 ' California Evidence Code section 352221 will
also be used by judges to prevent "esoteric ventures into the un-
known" 2 2 by excluding excessively prejudicial or time consuming
evidence.
The impact of Witherspoon on the actual admission of polygraphic
evidence is not yet known. The decision does open a long closed door
for the proponents of polygraphic evidence, and the courts can no
longer discard the offered polygraph results citing previous decisions as
the only basis for their ruling. The California courts must make an
examination of all relevant facts and determine admissibility on a case-
by-case basis. The way to admissibility will be found in the qualifica-
tions of the expert through which the evidence will be offered.
REQUIREMENTS FOR POLYGRAPH OPERATORS TO QUALIFY AS
EXPERT WITNESSES
An often overlooked aspect of opinions dealing with the admissibil-
ity of polygraphic evidence is the need for qualification of the poly-
graph operator as an expert witness.223 Assuming the admissibility of
the polygraph results themselves, the question is whether the opinion of
the polygraph operator as to the interpretation of those results is
admissible.224
The California courts forbid the testimony of polygraph operators to
be introduced into evidence.225 In light of recent changes in the law
regarding the relationship between relevant evidence and expert testi-
mony,22' and the discussion of the court of the qualifications of a poly-
graphic operator as an expert witness in the Witherspoon case,22 7 a re-
examination of this policy seems imminent. The following sections will
review the applicable state statutory and judicial standards relating to
expert testimony, and suggest a possible framework to aid judges in
determining whether a particular polygraph operator is competent to
testify as an expert witness.
220. See id §403.
221. Id §352.
222. 133 Cal. App. 3d at 34, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
223. "A person is ... an expert [witness] if he has special knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony
relates." CAL. EVID. CODE §720(a).
224. See 133 Cal. App. 3d at 31, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
225. See McCormick, supra note 117, at 882-86; People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d
1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1975).
226. See CAL. CONST. art. I, §28(d). This provision is part of the so-called "Victims' Bill of
Rights", enacted into law by the voters of California in June, 1982. See supra text accompanying
notes 150-168.
227. 133 Cal. App. 3d at 30-33, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 619-621.
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A. Standards for Quajlfcation of Expert Witnesses
Qualifications for expert witnesses are established in California by
statute. California Evidence Code section 720228 proscribes the stan-
dards which expert witnesses must fulfill. Evidence Code section 801229
governs expert testimony.
Section 720 provides that a person is qualified to testify as an expert
if he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testi-
mony relates.230 This expertise must be shown before the witness can
testify,23 1 and can be proved through the introduction of any admissi-
ble evidence, including the witnesses' own testimony.232 The judge de-
termines if the witness is qualified as an expert,233 and this
determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse
of discretion.3 4 Section 720 is founded on the notion that in the pur-
suit of relevant evidence, 235 testimony by a witness claiming to be an
expert is admissible236 only if the witness has a recognized basis for
drawing the inference presented to the jury.23 7
Evidence Code section 801238 provides that an expert witness may
testify as to his opinion on matters related to a subject sufficiently be-
yond the common expertise of the trier of fact, 239 and where the ex-
pert's opinion is proper and necessary to an enlightened consideration
and a correct disposition of the ultimate issue.240 The testimony of an
expert is admissible because his professional pursuit or peculiar skill in
some department of science not common to men in general, enables
228. CAL. EVID. CODE §720.
229. Id §801.
230. Id §720(a).
231. Id
232. Id §720(b).
233. The trial judge's determination of the qualifications of a witness as an expert is given
considerable latitude by appellate courts. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24 at 39, 549 P.2d 1240
at 1250, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 at 154 (1.976).
234. Id at 39, 549 P.2d at 1250, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
235. "Relevant evidence means evidence. . . having any tendency in reason to prove or dis-
ProVe any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." CAL. EVID.
ODE §210.
236. "Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible." CAL.
Evm. CODE §351.
237. See GUIDE, supra note 160, at 4-15; see also CAL EVID. CODE § 702 (makes testimony of
witness inadmissible unless witness demonstrates personal knowledge of the matter). Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, permits an expert qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education" to testify "in the form of an opinion or otherwise" as to scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge that will assist the fact finders in understanding the evidence or deter-
mine a fact in issue. FED. R. EvID. 702. For the impact of the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence on the judicial reevaluation of the Frye standard, see McCoRMIcK, supra note 117, at
886-888.
238. CAL. EVID. CODE §801.
239. Id §801(a).
240. Wells Truckways, Ltd. v. Cebrian, 122 Cal. App. 2d 666, 675, 265 P.2d 557, 562 (1954).
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him to draw an inference from phenomena that would leave men of
common experience unenlightened.24' A properly qualified expert242
may offer an opinion based on facts presented in a hypothetical ques-
tion,24 facts he has observed himself,2' or the experiences derived
from his technical training.245 Once admitted, the testimony is to be
given the weight to which it appears to be justly entitled in each case.246
The jurors are not bound by the opinion of the witness and are free to
disregard it entirely if they find the evidence to be unreasonable.2 47
In applying these rules to the polygraph situation, courts have not
disagreed that a qualified polygraph operator may testify on the objec-
tive mechanical results of the polygraph test.248 There is not much dis-
sent from the view that this testimony would be of great assistance to
the trier of fact.24 9 The problem is when the expert testifies to the inter-
pretation of the polygraph results.
Under Evidence Code 801, an expert witness may reasonably rely on
matters personally known to him gained from his special exper-
iences.250 This language is subject to the exception for matters which
experts are legally precluded from using as a basis for an opinion.2 11
The function of this exception is to limit expert testimony to areas rele-
vant to the determination of the dispute. Irrelevant or speculative mat-
ters, or evidence declared to be an improper basis for an opinion, are
excluded by the operation of this section.252
The exception for evidence that is an improper basis for expert opin-
ion has served as a major stumbling block to the admission of poly-
graphic evidence in California.253 Proponents of polygraphic evidence
have often found themselves in the interesting situation of attempting
to prove the reliability of polygraphs through the use of an expert wit-
ness forbidden to express his opinion about polygraphy because of the
241. Id at 674, 265 P.2d at 562.
242. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148
(1976).
243. Kastner v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, 63 Cal. 2d 52, 57-58, 403 P.2d
385, 388, 45 Cal. Rptr. 129, 132 (1965).
244. Id at 57-58, 403 P.2d at 388, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
245. 122 Cal. App. 2d at 674, 265 P.2d at 562.
246. Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal. 2d 428, 432, 74 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1937).
247. People v. Cole, 47 Cal. 2d at 105, 301 P.2d at 857 (1956).
248. Witherspoon v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d 24, 32, 183 Cal. Rptr. 615, 620.
249. People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 111, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (1975).
250. CAL. EVIl. CODE §801(b).
251. Id Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states in part that "the facts or data in the
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion... if of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.., need not be
admissible in evidence." FED. R. EVID. 702.
252. CAL. EVID. CODE §801 (Comment, Law Rev. Comm'n).
253. See GUIDE, supra note 160, at 4-15, People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 30, 549 P.2d at 1244,
130 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
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judicial determination that polygraphy was an improper basis for an
opinion.
2 54
The "truth-in-evidence" portion of Proposition 8 is in conflict with
that portion of Evidence Code section 801 barring an expert from bas-
ing his opinion on matters precluded by law.2 5 Courts, under the pro-
visions of "truth-in-evidence", would be required to admit all relevant
evidence supported by the testimony of a qualified expert witness, un-
less the probative value of the evidence is "overborne by the familiar
dangers of prejudicing the jury, and undue consumption of time. 256
The statutory obstacle to the admission of expert testimony on the tech-
nique and results of a polygraphic examination would seem to be re-
moved by the operation of the "truth-in-evidence" provision.2"7
The court in Witherspoon v. Superior Court258 found no specific pol-
icy reasons which would require the exclusion of the opinion of the
polygraph operator on the analysis of the results of a polygraph test,25 9
especially considering the vast numbers of fields in which persons with
some iechnical or specialized training are permitted to express an opin-
ion.26° Citing Evidence Code section 801, the Witherspoon court noted
that adequate machinery existed to permit the trial court to exclude the
opinion testimony of unqualified polygraph operators, 261 a matter
within the sound discretion of the trial court.262
Trial courts will have difficulty determining the required qualifica-
tions for expert certification of a polygraph operator because testimony
relating to polygraphic evidence has been excluded for so long that no
court has determined what the qualifications must be. As the general
rule is that expert status is determined on a case-by-case basis, judges
will rely on the facts of each case and the asserted qualifications of the
witness for guidance in making the determination of expert witness
status.263
The competency of an expert is relative to the topic and fields of
264knowledge about which the person is asked to give an opinion. In an
254. See People v. Woehnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 127-28, 219 P.2d 70, 72-73 (1950).
255. See GUIDE, supra note 160, at 4-15.
256. See id at 4-47.
257. See Witherspoon v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d 24, 34-35, 183 Cal. Rptr. 615, 621
(1982).
258. 133 Cal. App. 3d 24, 183 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1982).
259. Id at 31, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
260. Id at 32, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
261. Id at 34, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
262. Wells Truckways, Ltd. v. Cebrian, 122 Cal. App. 2d at 677, 265 P.2d at 564. The defend-
ant in Witherspoon was given the chance to prove to the trial judge the expert qualifications of the
polygraph examiner in his case by the court's granting of a writ of mandate to the trial court to
hold an evidentiary hearing on the subject. 133 Cal. App. 3d at 35, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
263. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 39, 549 P.2d at 1250, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
264. Id at 39, 549 P.2d at 1250, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
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unproven area with untested methods before the jury, the competency
and experience of the expert would need to be convincing before his
evidence would be admitted. 65 The Frye court attempted to place po-
lygraphy into the broad categories of physiology and psychology, im-
pliedly requiring experts testifying on the polygraph to have a
background in those fields. 66 Courts are now beginning to recognize
that polygraphy has become a specialized field in and of itself.267
Courts are now accepting expert testimony from qualifed doctors,
scientists, or operators with adequate experience in the theory or practi-
calities of polygraphy.268
If polygraphic evidence is to be introduced through the testimony of
the polygraph operator, the California courts will require a set of mini-
mum criteria to help in their determination of the qualifications of a
polygraph operator as an expert witness. A framework for analysis is
necessary to ensure fair results and avoid undue consumption of time.
A determination must be based on objectively discoverable factors
which include: (1) training of the operator; (2) adequacy of experience;
(3) demonstrated ability; and (4) reputation for competence of the
operator.
A FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL EXAMINATION
OF POLYGRAPHER QUALIFICATIONS
Courts in other jurisdictions dealing with the problems of qualifying
polygraph operators as expert witnesses have recognized the failure of
state legislatures to supply adequate guidelines or establish training
standards for polygraphers.269 In those states which do not have poly-
graph licensing laws, the courts have relied on qualifications defined by
the polygraphers themselves.270
The Ninth Circuit, relying on standards proposed by polygraphers,
suggested in United States v. DeBetham27t that the correct focus in
qualifying polygraph operators should be on their attainment of a suffi-
cient degree of education and practical experience in the field of poly-
265. People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d at 100, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
266. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
267. See United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 689 (D.D.C. 1972). The court held there
that any individual with experience in the specialized area of the polygraph, whether they are
medical doctors, scientists, or polygraph operators can testify as to matters of acceptance, reliabil-
ity, and experiences with the machine. Id at 689.
268. Id at 689.
269. See United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1386 (S.D. Calif. 1972). Only eleven
states had enacted some legislation by the time of the DeBetham opinion. For the state of licens-
ing requirements today, see supra note 53.
270. Id
271. 348 F. Supp. 1377.
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graph examinations.272 The particular examiner's testing technique
and reputation for competence and integrity should also be
considered.273
Some jurisdictions encourage close judicial scrutiny of the polygraph
examiner's qualifications.274 Courts pay particular attention to the ex-
aminer's experience, formal training, and demonstrated ability.275 The
combination of these three factors has been held to be determinative.276
The examiner's expertise has been found to be the most critical factor
in assessing the proficiency of the polygraph operator.277
A. A Proposalfor Qualifying Polygraph Operators
The necessary minimum factors to prove a polygraph operator's
competency as an expert witness can now be drawn together into a pat-
tern that can be used as a basis for judicial determination of compe-
tency of individual polygraph operators on a case-by-case basis. The
first important factor to consider is the examiner's education.278
1. Education
While a formal college degree is helpful in establishing an exam-
iner's general intellectual capacity, far greater attention should be di-
rected at the amount of formal polygraphic training the examiner has
received.279 Successful completion of a course of instruction embody-
ing the minimum standards of training established for polygraph ex-
272. Id at 1386 (quoting J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION, THE POLYGRAPH
("LIE DETEcToR") TECHNIQUE 257 (lst ed. 1966)). Reid and Inbau suggested four basic stan-
dards that a polygraph operator must achieve before being recognized as an expert witness: (1) the
examiner possess a college degree, (2) the examiner have at least six months of internship training
under an experienced, competent examiner, (3) the examiner have at least five years' experience as
a specialist m the field of polygraph examinations, and (4) the examiner's testimony be based on
polygraph records that are produced in court and available for cross-examination purposes. Id
273. Id at 1386-87.
274. See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 313 N.E.2d 120 (Mass. 1974).
275. Id at 126.
276. Id The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in the Juvenile case, suggested that their purpose
was to guide the thinking of the lower courts, not to limit the discretion of trial judges by formu-
lating strict minimum standards. Id
27. Id The expert found qualified to testify in the Juvenile case was trained in polygraphy
while serving in the U.S. Army, and served as a polygraph examiner at the Military Police Crime
Laboratory for 5 years. He was later an advisor for lie detection to the Headquarters, European
Command for the U.S. Army, and in that capacity, conducted polygraph tests for the CIA, CIC,
CID and Interpol. It was estimated that this examiner had given between 22,000 and 30,000
polygraph examinations. Id; see also United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1972), in
which the examiner who qualified as an expert received his training at the Polygraph Examiners
School at Fort Gordon, Georgia. He had administered approximately 2,000 polygraph examina-
tions for the D.C. Police Department and at the request of several courts in the District of Colum-
bia, the U.S. Attorney's Office, the FBI, and law enforcement agencies in Virginia and Maryland.
Id at 690.
278. See 348 F. Supp. at 1385, 1386.
279. See id
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aminers by the American Polygraph Association would be a substantial
factor for judges to consider.28° A failure to have a sufficient educa-
tional background should not prevent an expert from offering evidence
showing to the satisfaction of the court that he has an adequate ground-
ing in the theory and procedures of polygraphy.281
2. Experience
The second factor for the court to consider is the adequacy of the
examiner's experience.282 A minimum time of field practice should be
required by the courts as a prerequisite for operator qualification as an
expert witness. A five year figure of required field service would seem
to be a reasonable requirement.283 A long period of field work by a
polygrapher is strong evidence of the expert's sincerity and dedication.
A five year investment of time in the pursuit of expertise is an indica-
tion of the examiner's familiarity with the polygraph process as applied
in "real-life" situations, a valid factor to consider in judging a witness'
qualifications. This minimum requirement should not weigh against
the operator when other considerations are present which show ade-
quate compliance with the experience requirement.284
3. Demonstrated Ability
The third factor to look at in considering whether a polygraph opera-
tor is a competent expert witness is the operator's demonstrated ability
in the administration and scoring of polygraph examinations.8 5 This
can be shown by examining the number of polygraph tests an operator
has conducted in his career.286 The operator's employment history can
be an important factor.2 87 Evidence of the number of times the indi-
vidual operator has testified as an expert in other criminal or civil pro-
ceedings is helpful in showing an examiner's standing in the
polygraphic community.288 The trial court is not to be limited in its
consideration of factors tending to show the operator's qualifications.289
280. AMERICAN POLYGRAPH AsSOCIATION CONST., art. III, cited in United States v.
DeBentham, 348 F. Supp. at 1386.
281. 350 F. Supp. at 690.
282. See 348 F. Supp. at 1386.
283. See J. REID & F.E. INBAu, TRUTH AND DECEPTION, 257 (lst ed. 1966), cited in 348 F.
Supp. at 1386.
284. See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 313 N.E. 2d at 126.
285. Id at 126.
286. See id at 126, 350 F. Supp. 685, 690.
287. See 313 N.E.2d at 126, 350 F. Supp. at 690.
288. See 350 F. Supp. at 690.
289. See United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. at 1386. "[T]he absence of legislated stan-
dards need not preclude the use of polygraph evidence, as long as a qualified examiner can be
identified without an undue consumption of time." Id
1141
Pacfic Law Journal / Vol. 14
4. Competence and Integrity
A final consideration for courts to take into account in a proceeding
to establish competency of a polygraph operator is the examiner's repu-
tation.290 There would be a natural desire of any polygraph operator to
preserve and encourage his reputation by the exercise of caution in giv-
ing polygraphic interpretations. 29' An important basis for determining
a particular operator's competence and integrity in this regard can be
supplied by the examiner's willingness to produce the charts to be used
as the foundation for his opinion for an independent interpretation.292
Judges, through a consideration of examiner competence, experi-
ence, training, ability, and integrity, can make an adequate determina-
tion of an individual operator's qualifications to be an expert witness.
An examiner should be eminently qualified to offer a valid, probative,
and convincing opinion on the evidentiary value of his interpretation of
polygraphic evidence if he meets these four factors to the satisfaction of
the trial judge sitting in a California courtroom. 293
CONCLUSION
The time for recognition of polygraphic evidence as an important
tool in the search for truth has come. The theory of polygraphy, that
the unconscious reactions of the body are determinative of the truth of
a person's statements, has been proven accurate and reliable by labora-
tory experiments and field applications. The results of polygraphic ex-
aminations have been excluded from the California courtrooms by the
use of the Frye "general acceptance" test, but the change in the eviden-
tiary rules brought about by the "Truth-In-Evidence" provision of
Proposition 8 may require courts to admit the results if relevant. The
indication that this change has already begun can be found in the
Witherspoon case, which held that the blanket exclusion of polygraphic
evidence can no longer be maintained. When polygraphic evidence is
admitted, a competent and qualified polygraph examiner must be
found to testify as to the objective results and the opinions to be
reached from the polygraphic examination. A polygraph operator, to
be qualified to testify as an expert witness, must meet judicially estab-
lished standards, which must include an examination into the opera-
tor's competence, experience, training, and ability.
The polygraph examination can overcome the prejudice of years of
290. See id at 1386-87.
291. See id
292. See id
293. See Witherspoon v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d at 33, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
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adverse judicial scrutiny and prove itself as a valuable addition in the
arsenal of justice. Dean Wigmore, in the same year as the decision in
Frye v. United States, declared that "if ever there is devised a psycho-
logical test for the evaluation of witnesses, the law will run to meet
it."294 The California courts have taken the first wavering and cautious
steps toward judicial acceptance of the potential of the polygraph.
Fifty years of judicial anxieties are difficult to overcome. But overcome
they must be. Relevant polygraphic evidence has been kept out of the
courtroom long enough.
Thomas J Moses
294. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §875 (2d ed. 1923).
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